TLDR
Researchers at AmericanFortress proposed ZKPoSP, a post-quantum signature system for crypto wallets.
The method replaces elliptic curve signatures with zero-knowledge proofs.
Existing wallet addresses would stay the same, so no fund migration is needed.
Prototype tests showed proof generation took about 12 to 13 seconds.
The proposal follows other post-quantum efforts, including work from Project Eleven and the new Bitcoin Security Consortium.
Researchers at AmericanFortress, a Wyoming-based blockchain security company, have proposed a new way to protect Bitcoin and other crypto wallets from future quantum computer attacks. The system is called ZKPoSP, short for Zero-Knowledge Proof of Seed Provenance.
The goal is to keep wallets secure without forcing users to move their funds to new addresses. This has been a major sticking point in past quantum-safety proposals.
The research is laid out in a paper titled “ZKPoSP: Post-Quantum Zero-Knowledge Proofs for Hierarchical Deterministic Wallets.” It focuses on wallets that use common key derivation standards like BIP32, BIP44, and SLIP-10.
How the New System Works
Instead of using elliptic curve signatures, the current standard for verifying wallet ownership, ZKPoSP uses zero-knowledge proofs. These proofs let a person show they control a wallet’s seed phrase without revealing the seed itself.
Because the seed stays hidden, the authors say a wallet owner could still prove ownership even if a private key gets exposed. The paper also introduces QBIP32, a key derivation method built to work with multiple elliptic curves.
The team built a working version of the system in Rust using the RISC Zero zero-knowledge virtual machine. Early benchmarks showed proof generation took roughly 12 to 13 seconds, while verification took about 9 to 10 milliseconds.
The paper also describes a faster mode meant to run after Q-Day, the point when quantum computers could break current encryption.
Why Quantum Computers Are a Threat
Researchers pointed to recent gains in quantum hardware, including Google’s Willow processor, as a reason the timeline for this risk is shrinking. A powerful enough quantum computer could use Shor’s algorithm to calculate a private key from a public key.
That matters for Bitcoin because spending coins exposes the public key on the blockchain. Once exposed, a quantum computer could theoretically use that key to forge a signature and move the funds.
Glassnode, a blockchain analytics firm, estimated in May that about 6.04 million Bitcoin, close to 30% of the total supply, already have exposed public keys.
This new proposal is not the first attempt to solve the problem. Earlier this month, Project Eleven suggested a similar method that would let people prove wallet ownership through a seed phrase instead of a signature after Q-Day.
In March, BTQ Technologies tested BIP-360 on a Bitcoin quantum testnet built to try out quantum-resistant transaction formats.
The U.S. Department of Commerce also pledged more than $2 billion toward quantum computing companies and manufacturing programs.
Last week, a group of major companies formed the Bitcoin Security Consortium. Members include BlackRock, Coinbase, Strategy, Fidelity Digital Assets, and Galaxy.
The group is putting $15 million toward Bitcoin security research over the next three years, with quantum defense as one of its main focus areas.
For now, ZKPoSP remains a research proposal. It has not been adopted by any blockchain network, and any real-world use would require buy-in from wallet providers, exchanges, developers, and miners.
